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Abstract—In recent years, increase in the development of 
connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) has sparked 
cyber security concerns. In particular, vehicle-to-everything 
(V2X) communication, which is essential for CAV and the 
transportation system, has introduced a new threat landscape 
and created several attack surfaces for malicious agents. The 
available literature on cyber-attacks mostly concentrate on 
sophisticated tools and equipment in performing malicious 
activities. However, ignorance of simple attack and defense 
methods, sometimes as simple as defining proper access 
policies, is among top reasons for cyber-attacks. This paper 
aims to emphasize on the need for practicing security-by-
design and increase awareness of manufacturers and 
developers to adopt minimum security measures. A generic 
network communication vulnerability assessment method is 
adopted to perform navigational attack through GPS 
falsification on connected vehicles, using an Unmanned 
Ground Vehicles (UGV) as a case study. This paper 
underlines the Wi-Fi security threats if used for V2X 
communication without proper access control measures in 
place. The experimental analysis demonstrates exploitation of 
a vulnerability which allows full control and backend 
navigation manipulation with respect to the UGV movement.  
Keywords—Connected and Autonomous Vehicle, Robot 
Operating System (ROS), Vulnerability Assessment, V2X 
communication, GPS Attack. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few years, there has been an enormous increase 
and interest in autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles 
[1]. Connected and Autonomous vehicles (CAVs) are not 
just standalone systems as the automation seen in 
manufacturing industries – they are, however, connected 
systems that communicate with other vehicles and 
infrastructure to attain a satisfactory and acceptable level of 
performance and safety in an unstructured natural 
environment [2]. This connectivity involves sharing of data 
such as position, speed, live camera feeds and other 
information[3]. As cars are continually designed around 
digital systems, there is a need for prevalent protocols and 
frameworks in data and communication technology [4], [5].  
Wireless networking between vehicles and inside the 
vehicle itself comes in two types: i) Inter-vehicle 
networking around the range and proximity of the car in the 
local region, known as vehicle to vehicle (V2V), and ii) 
Networking between a car and the road infrastructure 
system, known as  vehicle to infrastructure (V2I). For these 
two networking technologies, the collective term used in 
literature is V2X  [6]. By quickly exchanging information, 
such as velocity, place and activity of a car, V2X can be 
used to avoid accidents [7]. For instance, if the brakes are 
used by a car in an emergency, this car could transmit a 
warning signal, providing drivers of other cars with a quick 
warning that they will need to stop quickly. Major tech 
industries have already started picking up interest in CAVs. 
Apple announced plans to integrate its mobile operating 
system, iOS, into vehicles in 2018, and Google announced 
a collaboration with significant vehicle companies in 
January 2014 to create its Android automotive operating 
system [4], [6], [8].  
Reliance on cyber components makes CAVs susceptible to 
cyber-attacks as well as physical attacks whereby an 
adversary can manipulate shared data, internal sensor 
readings and GPS signals with the intent of committing 
fraud or causing harm [2], , [10]. Numerous cyber threats 
and exploits are reported in the literature, such as hacking 
ECUs (Engine Control Unit), GPS spoofing, modified 
traffic signs, CAN (Car Area Network) injection of fake bits 
and manipulation of sensor values [17] [18]. The available 
literature on the security attacks to CAVs is quite vast [11], 
[12], [13]. However, they are mostly concentrated on using 
bespoke hardware and sophisticated, industry-specific tools, 
such as ODB-II scan tool, while security-by-design has not 
been well investigated in the literature [14].   
Other important challenge in CAVs is the adoption of the 
IEEE 802.11 network communication standard for V2X 
communication, which raises cyber-attack potential [15]. 
Some automotive manufacturers suggest the usage of Wi-Fi 
technology for connected cars communication, though it has 
been rejected by European Commission in 2019 [16].  
Communication between the vehicle and infrastructure, 
such as road signs, offers remote attack access for a 
malicious actor to detect and exploit vulnerabilities in the 
system [17]. Unlike a typical home network, a successful 
breach of security on a connected vehicle’s GPS signal or 
any of its embedded systems and sensors may not only 
trigger traffic disruption and waste of time but also directly 
endanger the safety of its human passengers and 
environment. This motivated us to further investigate and 
highlight the challenges of  adopting Wi-Fi technology for 
autonomous vehicle use cases and underline the V2X 
security challenges caused by the known vulnerabilities of 
Wi-Fi  [18]. This problem becomes more pertinent as simple 
and easily accessible tools on a computer can be used to 
launch an attack as demonstrated in this paper. 
The aim of this paper is to emphasize on the need for 
practicing security-by-design principles for all the range of 
autonomous vehicles, including those that are developed for 
research purposes before taking them to real-world 
applications. To achieve this goal, an autonomous 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), Husky, is used as case 
study. Husky is a leading robotic platform for research and 
development. The security research community can take 
advantage of  the similarity between the robotic platform 
and an actual AV, albeit low-cost, to perform security-
focused research in the CAV industry, as we did in this 
paper. Unmanned Ground Vehicles are primarily robot 
mobility system with a base architecture of an autonomous 
car [19]. There are several examples of autonomous UGV, 
such as vehicles developed for the DARPA Grand 
Challenge [20], the Talon which is used for explosive 
threats [21], Uran-9 used for combat and stealth 
reconnaissance by counter-terrorism unit of the Russian 
Army [22], and Clearpath Robotics Husky [23].  
This paper demonstrates and proves that a navigational 
attack through ROS (Robot Operating System) using basic 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessment TTPs 
(Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) is possible without 
the “need” for sophisticated hardware to perform GPS 
attack on the Husky (and most probably on similar products 
used for research purposes). Moreover, this paper shows 
how the vulnerabilities of Wi-Fi technology could be 
exploited to control the vehicle’s movement in the absence 
of proper access control measures. In our demonstration, we 
hacked a WPA2 protected Wi-Fi communication and gained 
access to the UGV network. Thereafter, we used 
vulnerability scanning tools, such as NMAP, to figure out 
the network topology, services being run and open ports. 
This paper lay emphasis on ROS 1.0 as it is still heavily used 
in research and development of Unmanned Vehicles (UVs). 
According to a 2020 ROS community survey [24], most of 
the community is still uncomfortable with ROS 2, therefore, 
making the switch to a newer and safer version of ROS 
slower than anticipated. This is also supported by ROS 
Metrics report that Kinetic Kame distro is one of the most 
downloaded ROS packages in 2020 [25]. These statistics 
make ROS 1.0 the most used operating system in UV’s 
research which is devoid of any network security features 
[26]. Hence, this paper demonstrates that simple attacks can 
compromise a UV running on ROS 1.0, thereby, increasing 
awareness of stakeholders in AV industry on low-cost 
cyber-attacks and the need for adopting a security-by-design 
strategy. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 
II discusses the available literature on security of 
autonomous vehicles and how this paper differs from the 
state-of-the-art. The experimental setup is discussed in 
Section III, while Section IV presents our results. Section V 
concludes the paper and proposes future work direction. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Stottelaar et al. [11] studied remote attacks on AV sensors, 
i.e. Camera (MobileEye C2-270) and LiDAR (ibeo LUX 3). 
They aimed to degrade sensors data quality in order to 
impair the vehicle decision making. They considered three 
attack scenarios: 1) Front/rear/side attack –by installing a 
hardware that allows a remote attack to the vehicle, 2) 
Roadside attack – which concentrates on road infrastructure, 
and 3) Evil mechanic attack –the attacker has physical 
access to the vehicle e.g., during maintenance, an attacker 
can mount a jamming device [11]. The researchers 
performed a blinding attack on the camera and the exposure 
was increased to either maximum or lowest level during the 
attack, making object identification virtually impossible by 
camera feeds [11]. 
Vincenzo Diloffo et al. [12], investigated two vulnerabilities 
in the ROS data distributed services (DDS) using an 
OpenSSL spy process and security property file 
manipulation. They used an altered OpenSSL library by 
intercepting the publisher and the subscriber messages to 
gain access and control the autonomous vehicle. They also 
manipulated the security configuration file in ROS. The 
attack involved an attacker masquerading the credentials 
and certificates in the config file and ultimately gaining full 
administrative access to data and private keys of the victim. 
A research on the collateral effect of hardening mobile robot 
using message encryption on nodes that manage the Lidar 
and camera in ROS is presented in [27]. This paper studied 
the robot’s performance under different computing 
capabilities and encryption algorithms (3DES, AES, and 
Blowfish). A denial-of-service (DoS) attack on teleoperated 
robotic systems was performed in [13]. The attack was 
conducted on the Raven II surgical robot running on ROS 
to determine the impact of denial of service attack on 
teleoperated surgical robots. The attacking machine was 
connected to the same subnetwork as the robot being able to 
compromise the exchanged plaintext messages.  
In 2018, a hardware trojan enabled denial of service attack 
on CAN bus was presented [28]. The attack exploited the 
broadcasting nature of CAN protocols and attached a trojan 
infected CAN receiver on the bus as a node. In this kind of 
attack exploitability is limited due to its dependence on the 
physical access [28]. In [29] a GNSS (Global Navigation 
Satellite System) spoofing attack on a Hornet Mini UAV iis 
presented. The researchers exploited the extent of UAV 
vulnerabilities to deceptive GNSS spoofer. They used a 
software-defined radio platform with a digital signal 
processor (DSP) at its core. The GPS spoofer, initially used 
in [30], transmits false GPS location to the UAV resulting 
in crash. 
Our research varies greatly from the state-of-the-art in that 
we do not use any sophisticated hardware to achieve our 
aim. Our objective is to demonstrate the feasibility of 
performing a cyber-attack on connected vehicles by 
adopting a generic vulnerability assessment strategy. We 
use over-the-shelf scanning tools to find possible entry 
points in UGV navigational system and subsequently gain 
access and control the UGV remotely. This will hopefully 
highlight the need for implementation of proper security 
policies by manufacturers.  
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
Husky is a rugged, all-terrain,  and easy-to-use UGV for 
rapid prototyping and research applications [31]. It 
accommodates stereo cameras, LIDAR, GPS, IMUs and an 
on-board computer running on ROS 1.0. The Husky can be 
operated autonomously or by joystick teleoperation, 
depending on the intended research or purpose. Fig 1 shows 
our Husky UGV with the LiDAR and mounted axis network 
camera.  
The decision to use Husky UGV as the target in this research 
is based on the following: (1) Husky UGV uses a technology 
that is similar to what is used in a driverless car; both use 
perceptions and sensors to plan and execute their goal. So, 
Husky is equipped with core components of CAVs. (2) 
Husky is specifically built for research, development and 
integration of sensors in autonomous vehicles. This feat 
makes it a suitable choice of target for this paper. (3) 
Although Husky has not been built and equipped for high-
level operations, it will help us to demonstrate the 
vulnerability to simple cyber-attack and highlight the threat 




Fig. 1: visualized chassis of Husky UGV showing the mounted 
LiDAR and the axis network camera 
Husky comes with a portable high-powered Wi-Fi base 
station. The base station serves as a hub for other computers 
to connect to the Husky robot remotely. This base station 
may be used in the lab or on the field as a long-distance Wi-
Fi access point for communicating with the robot. Fig 2 
shows the representation of the communication pattern 
between different devices in the network. 
 
 
Fig.  2: Network representation of Husky UGV 
As the base station serves as an access point for other 
devices to communicate with the UGV, it is important to 
connect to the base station before an attack can be carried 
out. The base station is protected with WPA2 security 
protocol, which is vulnerable to dictionary attack or 
handshake replay attack.  
The first stage is installing ROS on the operator’s computer 
(see Fig.  4), that runs on Ubuntu. In doing this, we create 
a workspace specifically for this research on the operator’s 
computer, connected to Husky through the already 
established wireless communication connection and 
download all the core packages of ROS to the operator’s 
computer. These core packages include standard utilities 
and libraries in the robot operating system. We used a PC 
for running the ROS with Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-8750H 
CPU @ 2.20GHz (12 CPUs), 2.2GHz processing power 
and memory of 16GB RAM. 
 
The base station is preconfigured from the factory to 
connect automatically to the microhard radio on the Husky. 
In the initial setup, the base station establishes a connection 
with the microhard radio, which then connects to the 
onboard computer on Husky using OpenSSH connection. 
When the operator connects to the base computer through 
wireless communication, the attack lunches a replay attack 
and gains access to the network. Having access to the 
network communication does not translate to having access 
to husky UGV since we need to launch an SSH connection 
to the husky before a communication can be established. 
Our aim is to manipulate the navigational system and take 
control of the Husky remotely. Fig 3 illustrates the 
graphical representation of the attack model.  
 
 
Fig.  3: Network Representation of the attack 
To start with the vulnerability assessment on Husky, the 
network scan for a general enumeration of network-
connected components was performed to get the services 
and functions of the components. Then, an in-depth 
vulnerability scanning of the Husky and other components 
was done. Fig 4 shows the network topology of the attack, 
in this figure, the attacker is seeing the husky network as a 




Fig.  4 Network topology of the attack 
A. Tools Used in this experiment 
We used Kali Linux on the attacking machine as performed 
in this research. Kali Linux is a specific-purpose 
information security operating system used for security 
auditing and advanced penetration testing. A large number 
of tools are integrated in this OS which makes it suitable 
for our research purpose. These tools are available to 
perform vulnerability assessment on computer systems and 
networks. The tools mainly used in this research are: 
• Aircrack-ng for wireless communication attack 
• Arpspoof for ARP poisoning against the base station 
• Bettercap for wireless network reconnaissance 
• NMAP for passive and active system 
reconnaissance after gaining access to the network  
• Metasploit for vulnerability scanning and 
exploitation 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
In our experiments we have followed four steps as we 
explain in this section, i.e., (i) Reconnaissance, (ii) 
Vulnerability assessment, (iii) Exploitation, (iv) Post-
exploitation. 
A. Reconnaissance 
Within the reconnaissance phase we identified the 
operating system and services running on Husky UGV by 
initially lunching a brute force attack on the microhard 
radio, as it uses Wi-Fi technology we were able to perform 
the attackUsing the net.recon module in Bettercap Suit in 
Kali, we were able to see the devices on the network along 
with  information about the type of devices, such as the axis 
network camera and Lidar(as it can be seen in Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig.  5: Reconnaissance and System Enumeration result 
Fig 5 shows all the network devices connected to the base 
station (192.168.131.50/gateway). The circled column 
showed the sent and receive data packets between the 
camera, Lidar, and the microhard radio and husky’s 
actuators. This reconnaissance shows there is an active 
communication that can either be intercepted, denied, 
eavesdrop or faked. The enumerations results illustrate the 
size of the packets being transferred within this network 
connection (the highlighted part in the right-hand side). 
Generally, using Nmap would have yielded an outcome 
where both the services and open ports on each device 
would have been enumerated, however, we limited the 
reconnaissance activity to the Husky to identify and exploit 
a potential vulnerability. 
B. Husky Vulnerability Assessment 
The IP address of the Husky is captured from the first 
reconnaissance phase, see Fig.  5; further targeted 
reconnaissance was done concentrating on the Husky on-
board computer to determine the services and open ports 
used by the ROS. The decision to specifically target onboard 
computer is based on the network architecture and how 
Husky operates. Attacking other components of the Husky 
network, such as the camera and LiDAR, would mean we 
require a special hardware that can read and interfere the 
signals being transmitted by them. Therefore, we 
concentrated on the onboard computer running on ROS to 
achieve the aim set out at the beginning of this paper. Using 
Nmap scan from Metasploit console in Kali on the Husky 
onboard computer we were able to find the open ports (Fig 
6 shows the result of the Nmap scan). 
 
 
Fig.  6: NMAP scan of Husky onboard Computer 
The Nmap scan result shows that the only open port is port 
22 for OpenSSH services, which is the only attack entry 
point. We adopted the attack model presented in [33] and 
[34] which comprehensively outlines the use of 
conventional penetration testing technique on autonomous 
vehicles. We performed further analysis using “msfconsole” 
in Kali to determine possible attacks on the identified entry 
point. Through reconnaissance we were able to confirm that 
the UGV runs the Kinetic Kame distro of the robot operating 
system. We installed the same OS and Roscore as the Husky 
on the attacker’s machine. This is particularly important for 
post-exploitation manipulation, and System Enumeration 
C. Exploitation 
An attempt to initiate an SSH connection with the base 
computer resulted in showing an error message as the SSH 
connection required authentication. However, we tried a 
range of exploits that could be found in Rapid 7 Metasploit 
database concerning SSH attacks, one of such is CVE-1999-
0502 [35]. This module automatically tests SSH login 
against a wordlist and reports successful logins. Successful 
execution of this exploit returns a shell session. The attacker 
gains an administrator privilege and accesses all the core 
ROS packages running on the Husky. We were able to 
successfully execute this exploit as shown in Fig 7. In Fig 7, 
the attacker has successfully gained access to the husky 
UGV onboard computer and a command shell session was 
established. 
 
Fig.  7: Successful Exploit of the SSH vulnerability 
D. Post Exploitation 
Following the successful execution of the exploit, the 
attacker now has access to all the Roscore packages. These 
packages enable an attacker to execute a remote 
manipulation of instructional commands while the UGV is 
in operation. Fig 8 shows the Roscore packages using the 
command Rostopic list to publish the packages (e.g., 
/gps/fix command is used for getting the coordinates of 
husky UGV position). 
In this scenario, a control experiment remote operator was 
configured to use the velocity controller movement 
package to direct the UGV to move at a distance of 1mile 




Fig.  8: ROS packages listed from the shell access 
Since our attacker machine has access to the Roscore 
packages, it can manipulate the content of the velocity 
controller of the UGV. This attack will not leave a footprint 
as the UGV is in operation due to the attacker’s command 
and the remote operator is not able to detect the changes. 
Even if the operator tries to use the teleoperation feature of 
the Husky, it will not override the attackers command as 
ROS considers the attacker to be the administrator. Fig 9 
shows that the attacker is able to make the robot to roll on 
the x-axis at the velocity of 0.5m/s and the attacker is able 
to overwrite the command of the remote operator. The  
commands used in achieving the manipulation in Fig. 9 are 
/husky_velocity_controller/cmd_vel,  which controls the 
movement of the robot, however, the controller that 
converts the cmd_vel signal into force, which drives the 
vehicle and dictates the direction is the 




Fig.  9: Attack feeding the robot command from the shell 
V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND FUTURE WORK 
With the focus on network vulnerability assessment on 
V2X communication in Husky UGV, this paper showed 
that a simple, non-sophisticated attack is possible when 
proper security measures are not in place. We could 
successfully exploit existing vulnerabilities on a UGV’s 
remote operating system due to the usage of Wi-Fi 
technology for communicating with the base station. 
Security and preferred network communication technology 
of CAVs is still hotly debated among government, car 
manufacturers and tech industry. The bone of contention is 
still the preference of a short-range Wi-Fi over a long range 
cellular (C-V2X) utilising a 5G technology by some auto 
manufacturers [16]. This is evident in the latest EU council 
rejection of European Commission’s Wi-Fi adoption plan 
for connected and autonomous vehicle [16]. The IEEE 
802.11 Wi-Fi communication standard is vulnerable to 
several cyber-attacks, such as Man-in-the-middle and 
packet sniffing. In this paper, we demonstrated that 
autonomous vehicles using Wi-Fi communication 
technology could be susceptible to low-cost attacks. Other 
forms of attack that could be done using this technique 
includes denial-of-service attack, spoofing attack and 
malware injection. Also, this paper is a further prove and 
awareness for developers, manufacturers and academia for 
the need to adopt a security-by-design in the development 
and deployment of CAVs, more especially for UGVs being 
used in mission critical services.  
The attack demonstrated in this paper can be devastating 
especially in scenarios where the UGV is being used for 
critical research purposes, such as weather predictions or in 
mining for terrain mapping. Accessing the backend 
information breaches the confidentiality and integrity of 
such data. While we considered Husky as a case study, 
these types of attacks could be successful in similar UGVs, 
as they may not be equipped with adequate defense 
measures. However, it is important to enforce principles of 
least privilege, authentication and encryption when 
developing UGVs and CAVs in a larger scale.  Future work 
could concentrate on investigating possible attacks on the 
CAVs using the long-range cellular (C-V2X) 5G 
technology, as well as performing similar research on 
ROS2. 
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